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Abstract 
This paper develops an overlapping generations model incorporating credit constraints, owner-
occupier and rental sectors, and detailed tax regulations to examine how the interaction of the 
inflation and the tax system affect the housing market. It shows that even modest rates of 
inflation can have very large effects on the home-ownership rates of young households, 
particularly at low real interest rates. This occurs even if there is a large supply response in the 
quantity of housing. The model suggests that the welfare costs of inflation could be ameliorated 
by exempting the inflation component of interest payments from income tax.  
This version (published August 2009) refers to additional results from an extended model developed for Motu 
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1. Introduction 
This paper develops a model that analyses the long run effects of inflation on housing 
markets. It has been sparked by concern among New Zealand policy makers that the home-
ownership rates of young, low-income households are declining. The decline in home-ownership 
rates does not appear to be voluntary, for it has not been welcomed by younger, poorer, 
households.  Rather, it has been accompanied by complaints that landlords have out-bid 
potential owner-occupiers because of tax laws that favour investment in property rather than 
interest earning assets when there is inflation.  
The argument that the interaction of inflation with the tax system can cause substantial 
economic distortions is well established (for example Viner (1923); Aaron (1976); Fischer and 
Summers (1989) or Feldstein (1996, 1997)).  The primary issue concerns the taxation of capital 
income. Since most countries tax nominal interest earnings rather than real interest earnings, and 
since nominal interest rates typically rise in response to an increase in long-term inflation 
expectations, the real after-tax return on interest earning assets declines as inflation rises. This 
creates an incentive for owners of capital to seek out tax-sheltered assets as the inflation rate 
increases. A favoured investment class is residential housing, for in the long run prices tend to 
rise at the rate of inflation but the capital gains are taxed lightly, if at all.  
By itself, the interaction of inflation with the tax system is not enough to reduce home 
ownership rates, for residential property acts as a tax shelter for owner-occupiers as well as 
landlords. Indeed, owner-occupiers with significant equity in their houses gain a larger tax 
advantage from housing than landlords, for imputed rent is typically not taxed. But inflation has 
a second effect on capital markets: it exacerbates the credit constraints facing borrowers. This is 
because bank imposed restrictions on the amount households can borrow are rarely adjusted for 
inflation, even though nominal interest rates increase when the inflation rate rises. If banks do 
not increase the amount credit-constrained households can borrow when nominal debt servicing 
payments increase, it becomes more difficult for these households to purchase houses 
(Modigliani (1976); Kearl (1979)).  
The theoretical model developed in this paper attempts to unravel these competing 
effects. The model analyses how the interaction of households who differ by age and income 
determines house prices, and how these prices affect housing allocations. Because the tax and 
credit market effects of inflation depend on the wealth and income of households, and because 
these depend in turn on household age, a version of the Modigliani-Brumberg style overlapping 
generations model developed by Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1998, 2006) is used.  2 
 
In the model, there is a plethora of households that differ by age, income, and marginal 
tax rate. These households choose to consume goods and services, to live in large or small 
houses, and to rent or buy. They save for retirement, pay tax, borrow and lend, face realistic 
borrowing constraints, and choose whether or not to invest in housing. House prices are 
determined endogenously by matching the supply of houses with the collective demand for 
housing by owner-occupiers and landlords. 
The model is used to identify some key economic factors that determine when the 
interaction of inflation and the tax system are likely to have large effects on the housing market. 
One of the most important factors is the long run supply elasticity of housing. This paper 
examines the cases when the housing supply is completely inelastic and when it has 
(approximately) unit elasticity. A second factor is the extent to which the total demand for 
housing changes with house prices and rents, as people choose to live together rather than alone. 
In this paper, the elasticities of the total demand for housing with respect to house prices and 
house rents are implicitly derived from the consumer maximisation problem. Following Ortalo-
Magné and Rady, the main results concern the case when variation in the number of households 
occurs because of variation in the age at which adult children choose to leave the parental home.  
However, the model has also been solved for the situation that people can share rented housing, 
which increases these elasticities. The latter case is discussed at length in a companion paper that 
analyses how capital gains taxes may affect the housing market (Coleman 2009).  
The model suggests that small changes in the inflation rate can have very large effects on 
home ownership rates even when there is no uncertainty and inflation is perfectly anticipated. In 
the main parameterisation studied, in which real interest rates are 5 percent, a one percentage 
point increase in inflation leads to an 8 - 11 percent age point decline in home ownership rates 
among young households. This occurs whether the housing supply is elastic or inelastic. When 
inflation rises, young households find mortgage repayments more onerous because nominal 
interest rates increase. If the housing supply is inelastic, landlords – attracted by tax-free capital 
gains – bid up property prices and young households are squeezed out of the property market. If 
the housing supply is elastic, landlords bid down rents, and credit constrained households are 
induced to delay purchasing a house and rent instead.  
While the size of the effect of inflation on home-ownership rates seems large, it should 
be noted that if real interest rates are 5 percent a one percentage point increase in the inflation 
rate increases nominal interest payments by approximately 20 percent. It is not implausible that a 
price change of this magnitude could induce a large number of young households to delay the 
purchase of a home and rent instead. In the model, the change in the number of households 3 
 
choosing to rent when the inflation rate increases is an increasing function of the discount rate 
and a decreasing function of real interest rates. When real interest rates are above 6 percent (as 
they were in New Zealand between 1985 and 1998) moderate inflation has relatively little effect 
on the fraction of households choosing to rent.   
The effect of inflation depends on the interaction of taxes and credit constraints, and 
largely disappears if there is only one distortion. When households can borrow as much as they 
like (but still repay their debt), moderate inflation rates have almost no effect on homeownership 
rates irrespective of tax rates. Households simply borrow enough early in life to make the 
additional mortgage payments without reducing real consumption, knowing they will be able to 
repay the debt later on.  If banks impose credit constraints but capital income is not taxed, a one 
percentage point rise in inflation leads to a 2 – 3 percentage point reduction in homeownership 
rates among young households, rather than an 8-11 percentage point reduction. But taxation of 
capital income is not the primary reason why inflation has such a big effect on homeownership 
rates when there are credit constraints. Rather, it is the taxation of the inflation component of 
interest payments. If real interest income is taxed at normal income tax rates but the inflation 
component of interest earnings is exempted from tax, a one percentage point increase in 
inflation again only leads to a 2 – 3 percentage point reduction in home ownership rates.  This 
reinforces the traditional view of economists that taxing the inflation component of interest 
earnings is highly distortionary, even at what has been considered low inflation rates (Aaron 
1976; Feldstein 1997).  
The model is used to calculate how the inflation rate affects welfare. Under the 
assumptions that households that the supply of housing is inelastic, that agents have a log-linear 
utility function, and that interest income is taxed, an increase in the long term inflation rate from 
0 to 3 percent lowers lifetime welfare for all agents. In the main simulations examined, the 
welfare loss is equivalent to between 2 percent and 4 percent of lifetime consumption. This loss 
occurs for two reasons. First, inflation leads to higher nominal interest rates and higher house 
prices, forcing young people to rent for longer or to buy a small “starter” house rather than a 
large house. Secondly, it reduces real interest rates, distorting inter-temporal consumption and 
providing less incentive to accumulate capital to spend in retirement. However, inflation is not 
necessarily bad when there is an elastic supply of housing. In this case, inflation will raise the 
lifetime welfare of low income households by reducing the rent they pay early in life, enabling 
them to increase consumption when young. Inflation still causes welfare losses for middle and 
high income households, however, as the higher nominal interest rates make house purchase 
more difficult while young, and the lowers after tax real interest rates distort the timing of 4 
 
consumption. Nonetheless, when there is an elastic supply of houses, the overall welfare 
consequences of inflation will depend on the relative numbers of low income and high income 
households.  
The result that inflation is good for young people who rent has not been prominent in 
the literature (for an exception, see Pozdena 1988).  While this result may seem perverse, it 
occurs because of the existence of two distortions: the restrictions imposed on young people that 
prevent them borrowing against future income; and the excessive taxation of real interest 
earnings when there is inflation. In this world of second best, inflation can improve the welfare 
of credit constrained young people who rent by inducing unconstrained landlords to offer them 
low rents.  
The model highlights two issues relevant to current policy in New Zealand. First, given 
the structure of taxes in New Zealand, in which capital gains are exempt from tax, the recent 
deterioration in housing affordability may have been partly caused by the increase in the inflation 
target in 2001 and the subsequent increase in the average inflation rate. The analysis in this paper 
does not support the view that it is largely inconsequential whether inflation is in the top end or 
the bottom end of the 1 – 3 percent inflation target range. Secondly, if it is too difficult for the 
central bank to achieve very low rates of inflation in the medium term - say 0 - 2 percent - the 
adverse effects on homeownership can be ameliorated through tax reform. 
The model is related to several earlier papers.  It is conceptually similar to Feldstein 
(1997) as it examines the welfare effects of low inflation, but it clarifies some of his insights by 
incorporating a rental housing sector and by allowing the after-tax interest rate to depend on 
whether an agent is a borrower or lender. It builds on the model used by Slemrod (1982) and 
Hayashi, Ito, and Slemrod (1988) to study individual optimisation over a lifecycle when there are 
taxes and credit constraints, but extends it by finding equilibrium house prices. It extends the 
equilibrium lifecycle model of housing markets analysed by Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1998) and 
Coleman (2007) by incorporating taxes and by allowing the supply of housing to be elastic.  
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, the details of the model are presented 
and a sketch of the solution technique is offered. In section 3, key results of the model are 
shown for four different scenarios: when the housing supply is elastic or inelastic; and when the 
inflation component of interest is taxed or tax exempt. This is followed by an outline of the way 
the results of the model depend on key parameters such as interest rates and credit constraints in 
section 4. Finally, the results are discussed and conclusions are offered in section 5.  
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2. An intergenerational model of housing demand 
2.1.  The basic framework  
The paper calculates equilibrium prices, saving patterns, consumption and housing 
allocations in an overlapping generations model of an economy that comprises a multitude of 
households that differ by age and income. The model is an extension of the model used by 
Coleman (2007) to analyse the effect of inflation and credit constraints on the housing market. 
In turn, it is based on the housing model of Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1998). In the model, there 
are four cohorts, each of which lives four periods and then dies. Agents have exogenously 
determined labour income and consume a single non-storable good. They also gain utility from 
renting or purchasing a single unit of housing. These housing units come in two sizes, small flats 
or large houses. Agents choose among different patterns of housing and consumption to 
maximise their utility. Agents can borrow or lend at exogenously determined interest rates, 
although young agents face credit constraints. Agents can also become landlords. They pay 
income tax on any interest earnings or on rental income. In the last period of life agents 
consume all wealth except their house, which is inherited by a younger generation.  
The model is solved under two different assumptions about the supply of housing. In the 
first case, the supply of flats and houses is determined exogenously. In the second case, separate 
upward sloping supply curves for the quantity of flats and houses are specified, so that the 
equilibrium number and mix of properties is determined endogenously.  
2.2.  Agents 
The N agents in each cohort live for four periods labelled i = {0,1,2,3}. A period is T 
years long. Agents differ by income and while any pattern of income is possible, agents are 
assumed to have a constant place in the within-cohort income distribution. Agent 1 has the 
lowest income. In period t, agent j born in period t-i has real labour income  
   
,0 ij
t j iti Y gY ω − =   (1) 
where    j ω   = idiosyncratic factor affecting agent j relative to average   cohort earnings;  
    i g   =  factor reflecting the life-cycle earnings of the cohort in its i
th period; and  
   
0
ti Y −  = average income of cohort at time of birth. 6 
 
Nominal income is 
, ij
tt PY , where  t P  is the pre-tax price of the good.  An indirect goods 
and services tax is applied to goods other than housing at rate 
g τ , so the post tax price of the 
good is (1 )
g
t P τ + . Incomes and the prices of goods both increase at a constant inflation rate π, 
where 1 π +   1 tt PP + = . 




, , and has housing choices described by a vector of three indicator variables 
,, ijh
t I ={ }
,, ,, ,, ,,
ijR ijF ijH
ttt III that equal one if the agent has housing tenure h in period i of his or 
her life at time t, and zero otherwise. There are three possible housing tenures: an agent can rent 
a flat (R), purchase a flat (F), or purchase a house (H). Age zero agents can live with their parents 
at zero cost, although they gain zero utility from doing so.
1
   
  In period t agents obtain utility  
, ,, , ,, ( , ) ln( )
ij ijh ij h ijh
tt t t
h
uc c vI = + ∑ I   (2) 
It is assumed 
HF vv > as houses are bigger than flats, and 
FR vv > , as agents can shape 
an owned flat in their own image, whereas they cannot modify a rented flat. Agents can only live 
in one housing unit in any period. Agents born at time t choose consumption and housing paths 
to maximise discounted lifetime utility: 









U uc β ++
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=∑ I    (3) 
Households are assumed to receive their income, purchase, rent, or sell property, borrow 
or lend, and consume at the start of each period, although they gain utility from housing by living 
in it throughout the period. In the last period, agents are assumed to sell or realise all assets 
except their last owned housing unit, repay any debts, and consume all of their wealth. They die 
at the end of period 3, at which point their housing unit is distributed to younger cohorts.  At 
time t a fraction  i κ  is left to the cohort born at t-i for i=0,1,2; by assumption it is either equally 
distributed across all agents of that cohort, or left to the jth agent, thus preserving the 
intergenerational income ranking
2
i κ . The weights   are chosen so that agents do not receive an 
                                                 
1 Coleman (2009) alters this structure and allows households to rent half a house. If they do so, they pay half the full 
rent, but the utility they get is a free parameter that can be allowed to be smaller than, equal to, or greater than half 
the utility from renting a whole house.  The results are similar, but there are some subtle differences in the 
properties of the model. The main difference is that more low income people rent when they can rent half a house 
as this allows them to consume more when young. See Coleman (2009) for a longer discussion. 
2 Coleman (2009) has a third option: every odd numbered person receives no inheritance, while every even 
numbered person inherits two properties. The results are similar, indicating that the results are not dependent on the 
assumption that agents receive some inheritance.  7 
 
inheritance until relatively late in life. This proves to be an important choice, for if agents inherit 
early, they have much less need to save for a housing unit. In this paper,  2 1 κ = . In the utility 
maximisation equation below, Inheritt is the average value of the inheritance left by the generation 
dying at the end of time t-1 and inherited at time t.   
2.3.   Taxes and the housing market 
Because the focus of the paper is the way capital income tax affects housing and 
consumption choices, the ways that the New Zealand tax system affects housing have been 
carefully modelled. Five features of the tax system have been modelled. First, interest and rent 
income is taxed at an agent’s marginal tax rate. There are two marginal tax rates: τ1 for agents 
with real income in period t less than τ
*; and τ2 ≥ τ1 for agents with real income greater than or 
equal to τ
*.  It is assumed that the tax threshold is automatically adjusted for inflation and thus 
constant in real terms. Secondly, the capital gains tax rate is zero. No property appreciation, 
either for an owner-occupied house or for a leased flat, is taxed. Thirdly, imputed rent is tax 
exempt. Fourthly, a landlord can deduct interest payments associated with a mortgage when 
calculating taxable income. Thus a landlord pays tax on rent net of interest payments, but no tax 
on any capital appreciation. Fifthly, there is a goods and services tax that is applied to 
consumption but not to rent or property. In the model, the goods and service tax rate is set 
endogenously at a rate that makes the total tax take (tax on capital income plus tax on goods and 
services) equal to a set fraction of labour income, in this case 
* 10
g τ = percent. This ensures that 
any changes in the structure of capital incomes taxes do not have revenue implications for the 
Government. Agents do not receive utility from government expenditure. 
Although the details of the tax system are closely based on the New Zealand tax regime, 
it is straightforward to change theses details. In the paper the effects of an alternative tax regime 
in which real interest earnings rather than nominal interest earnings are taxed are also examined. 
Coleman (2009) investigates the effects of introducing different types of capital gains taxes: many 
of the results are qualitatively similar, so long as the capital gains tax rate is lower than the top 
marginal tax rate. 
Flats and houses cost 
F
t P  and 
H
t P  to purchase. Flats can also be leased, at price 
R
t P that 
is paid in advance at the beginning of the lease. The rent is paid to a landlord, who, for 
convenience, is restricted to be an agent in period 2 of their lives. The number of landlords is 
endogenous; an indicator variable 
,,* ijR
t I  indicates whether or not the j




   
 Because there is no uncertainty, the after-tax return from purchasing a flat in period t, 
leasing it, and selling it in period t+1 is equal to the after-tax return from lending money. As 
such, the relationship between rent, tax rates, flat prices, and interest rates is  
2 21 2 (1 )(1 (1 )) (1 (1 ))
R TF F T
t t tt t P r PP r ττ τ + − +− += +−  (4) 
or  
   
2
22
(1 (1 )) (1 )










 + − −+
=  − +− 
  (5) 
where 
F
t π  is the rate of price appreciation for flats. The right hand side of equation 4 is the 
after-tax return in period t+1 from investing
F
t P in interest earning bonds. The left hand side is 
the after-tax return at t+1 from using the same sum to purchase a rental flat at time t. It 
comprises the after-tax rent paid at time t and reinvested at interest, plus the untaxed proceeds 
from selling the rental unit at time t+1. Since interest payments by landlords are fully tax 
deductible, the return to a landlord is independent of their level of gearing. 
It is assumed that the landlords are high income agents in period 2 of their lives, so after-
tax returns are calculated using the top marginal tax rate τ2.
4
In each period, agents choose between one of the three housing options, or not having 
housing. Consequently, there are potentially 256 different housing patterns possible through an 
agent’s lifetime. Rather than calculate the utility of each of these patterns, I only let agents 
choose from a much smaller set of patterns, Η. To reduce the number of possible patterns, I 
impose a series of restrictions on the lifetime housing options available to an agent. The three 
restrictions are: (i) only 0 period agents may choose no housing; (ii) only period 0 and period 1 
agents may choose to rent; and (iii) except in the last period, agents’ housing choices must not 
worsen through time
  
5 H .  By this means, the set    is reduced to 23, H ={0RFF, 0RHF, 0RHH, 
0FFF, 0FHF, 0FHH, 0HHF, 0HHH, RRFF, RRHF, RRHH, RFFF, RFHF, RFHH, RHHF, 
RHHH, FFFF, FFHF, FFHH, FHHF, FHHH, HHHF, HHHH}. An agent’s optimal 
discounted utility is calculated for each of these patterns, and the agent is assumed to choose the 
pattern that provides the greatest discounted utility. The model is solved using two different 
                                                 
3 If there is demand for f flats, the f highest income individuals are assumed to own one flat each.  
4  If there is a high demand to rent property, it is possible that the last landlord in the model is on the low marginal 
tax rate. Nonetheless, it is assumed that competition between high income landlords determine rents, so the top 
marginal rate is used.  
5 Coleman (2009) relaxes these restrictions further, allowing agents rent in the third and fourth periods of their lives 
if they rent throughout their lives. The results are qualitatively similar, although the fraction of the population 
renting increases.  9 
 
assumptions about the stock of housing. In the first, the number of houses and flats is set 
exogenously and is completely inelastic. There are n
H houses and n
F flats. It is assumed that 
4
HF nn N +≤ . This means there are no vacant houses, so property prices and rents are positive 
in equilibrium. In the second, there is an elastic supply of flats and houses, and the quantity of 
each is determined in equilibrium along with rents and prices. Linear supply functions are 
specified: 
  ( ) 01
01
F F FF H
t tt








                     (6) 
In this specification the price of flats is an increasing function of the total number of 
properties (to reflect the possible scarcity of land), while the price of houses is determined as a 
variable premium over the price of flats (to reflect the additional building costs). In most of the 
simulations presented below, parameters are chosen so that a 1 percent increase in the number 
of properties leads to about a 1 percent increase in the price of flats.  
2.4.  The lending market 
There is a non-profit financial intermediary that accepts deposits and issues mortgages at 
an interest rate  t r . Agents can lend or borrow as much as the bank allows them at the one period 
interest rate  t r , subject only to the restriction that they have a zero debt position at the end of 
their life.   The economy can either be closed, in which case the interest rate is determined 
endogenously and aggregate deposits equal aggregate loans, or open, in which case real interest 
rates are determined exogenously and the net foreign asset position can be non-zero. There are 
no restrictions on the deposit contract, and interest on a deposit made at time t is paid at time 
t+1. Agents pay tax on this interest at their marginal tax rate, but do not get a tax deduction for 




 An agent’s 
positive funds are labelled  .  
The mortgage contract is subject to three restrictions.
7
i) The loan to value restriction.  
  
                                                 
6 To reduce computational complexity, the marginal tax rate is calculated on the basis of labour income, not total 
income. Otherwise the marginal tax rate is determined endogenously.  
7 Note that banks impose these restrictions even though there is no uncertainty in the model 10 
 
The mortgage may not exceed a certain fraction of the value of the property. In 
particular, the gross amount borrowed 
, ij
t D
− cannot exceed the value of property multiplied by 
the loan to value ratio θ: that is  














− >  if the agent borrows.) This restriction means that agents who rent cannot 
borrow to smooth consumption, although they can save.  
ii) The regular cash payment restriction.  
Banks only issue η-year table mortgages, and require a “cash payment” in the period the 
mortgage is issued. This restriction is imposed to mimic a standard condition of a table 
mortgage, namely that a customer is required to make regular cash repayments CP of equal size 
throughout the life of the mortgage rather than a large repayment at its terminal date. The 
payment size CP is chosen to ensure the mortgage is retired at the end of the term: if D
0- is 









=  +− 
            (8) 
η is assumed to be 25 years.
8
It is not possible to exactly replicate this feature of a standard mortgage contract in the 
model. However, a close approximation is achieved by requiring the customer to make a 
payment that pays off some of the interest and principal in any period he or she has debt. In 




−  is required to open up a separate account with the 
bank and make a deposit of size  


















+ +−  
  (9) 
into this account. This deposit earns (untaxed) interest at rate rt. This means the net borrowing 
position of a borrowing agent, 
, , ,* ij ij ij
tt t DD D
− = − , is less than the gross borrowing position. 
Without this “cash payment” feature, many agents would prefer to purchase rather than rent 
simply because the interest payment occurs a period later than the rental payment. When the 
                                                 
8 Until recently, this has been the standard term for a table mortgage in Australia and New Zealand. 11 
 
“cash payment” requirement is imposed, purchasing a house requires a larger payment to the 
bank in period t than the cost of renting a house.  
iii) The mortgage-repayment-to-income restriction.  
The maximum amount an agent can borrow is restricted to ensure the mortgage 
repayment given by equation 8 is smaller than a fraction δ of income:  


















+ +−  
    (10) 
Note that this constraint is expressed in terms of nominal interest rates. 
The mortgage conditions are only imposed on agents in periods 0 and 1 of their lives in 
order to simplify the solution algorithm. In period 2 agents can borrow unrestricted amounts. 
The absence of a restriction in period 2 has little effect because agents are in their peak earning 
years, receive their inheritance at this time, and are actively saving or reducing debt to finance 
their retirement.  
2.5.  Utility maximisation 
An agent born at time t solves the following constrained maximisation problem (the jth 
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Lines 2 and 3 of equation (11) are the budget constraints facing the agent in the four periods. 
Lending and borrowing are entered separately as there are different after tax interest rates, and 
there are terms to reflect inheritance and rental income. Lending and borrowing in period 3 are 
restricted to equal zero, and 
i τ is the marginal tax rate applying in period i of the agent’s life. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions in lines 4 and 5 reflect the loan-to-value ratio constraints and the 
mortgage-repayment-to-income ratio constraints respectively. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions in 
line 6 reflect the requirement that non-negative amount are lent and borrowed. The agent solves 
the problem by calculating the maximum utility for each housing pattern in the set Η, and then 
selecting the housing pattern with the highest utility. The use of log-linear utility functions means 
it is relatively straightforward to calculate an analytical solution for the optimal consumption path 
given a particular housing pattern, even though each solution has 48 parts corresponding to the 
48 possible combinations of Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
9
2.6.  Equilibrium conditions 
  
In the simulations, the steady state equilibrium is found for an open economy in which 
agents borrow or lend at the world interest rate. In the steady state, the following price 
relationships hold: 
    (1 ) / (1 ) 1 tt rr π + += +  (12a) 
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==  − +− 
  (12d) 
Equation (12a) states that real interest rates are constant. In the open economy model, the rate r 
is the foreign real interest rate. Equation (12b) states that flat prices appreciate at a constant 
                                                 
9 In the periods 0 and 1, the financial asset position can be positive, zero, negative, or equal to the borrowing 




 For a set of parameters 
 Equation (12c) states that the ratio of house prices to flat prices is constant. Equation 
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10 If the number of flats and houses is determined exogenously, an equilibrium can be found in which incomes in 
the economy grow at a constant rate, and in this case the steady state equilibrium will have property prices growing 
at a faster rate than the rate of inflation. If the number of properties is determined endogenously and the income 
growth rate is positive, the only possible steady states occur when all people live in large houses, or when the quality 
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Equation (13a) requires that total consumption plus tax plus real earnings on the net 
bond position in each period equals total production. Equation (13b) is the net supply of foreign 
bonds, given that landlords are assumed to borrow 100 percent of the price of a flat. This will 
change through time if there is economic growth or inflation. Equation 13c says that the total tax 
take is equal to total GST revenue plus tax on interest and rent minus the tax deduction for 
landlords. Note that while it has been assumed landlords borrow 100 percent of the value of the 
property, tax revenue would not change if landlords had different gearing as the tax rate on 
positive balances is the same as the tax deduction they get when they borrow. Equations (13d΄) 
and (13e΄) require that the total demand for flats equals the supply of flats, and that the total 
demand for houses equals the supply of houses, when the supply of properties is determined 
exogenously. Equations (13d΄΄) and (13e΄΄) are the same equations for the case when the supply 
of property is elastic. 
2.7.  Parameterisation 
The set of baseline parameters {
0 ,, , , ,,, , , , , ,
HF
t ji hi NTY g v n n ω πβ κH  
}
**
12 ,,, ,, ,
g ηθδτ τ τ τ  and housing parameters { } ,
FH nn  are nearly the same as those used by 
Coleman (2007) and have been chosen to approximate features of the New Zealand economy.
11
In the baseline model, the discount rate is 3 percent, the real interest rate is 5 percent 
(assumed equal to the world rate), and banks impose borrowing restrictions that limit households 
to borrow up to 90 percent of the value of a property and to pay no more than 30 percent of 
their income in debt servicing. The banking sector parameters are changed in some of the 
simulations, but these reflect the conditions facing New Zealand borrowers since the year 2000.  
 
These are listed in table 1. Except for income distribution, the income parameters approximately 
match the basic lifecycle and cohort income patterns of New Zealanders reported in census 
documents, 1966-2001, under the assumption that the basic agent is a household comprised of a 
male and female of the same age. For simplicity, income is assumed to be uniformly distributed 
over the range $20000 to $80000.  
                                                 
11 Coleman (2007) uses 5 cohorts, not 4, and the parameters have been slightly modified. 15 
 
 
The tax rates also reflect New Zealand tax settings in 2000. In the baseline model, the 
marginal tax is 20 percent for households with incomes less than $50000, and 33 percent for 
households with incomes above that level. To demonstrate how taxes and inflation interact, the 
model was solved under a variety of alternative tax regimes: (τ1,τ2) = (0%,0%,), (10%, 10%), 
(20%, 20%), and (20%, 39%).
12 The model is also solved for a set of tax rules that exclude the 
inflation component of interest income from tax, and which only allow landlords to deduct real 
interest payments from their taxable income.
13
When the housing supply is inelastic, 57 percent of the properties are large houses, and 
42 percent of the properties are small houses. The total number of properties is 1 percent less 
than the number of agents, to ensure rents are positive in equilibrium. The parameters 
 The GST rate was chosen to ensure that capital 
income taxes and consumption taxes total to 10 percent of labour income.  
(,, )
RFH υυυ = (0.33,0.35,0.45) mean (approximately) that at the margin a household would be 
prepared to spend a third of their income on rent rather than have no accommodation; the 
benefit from living in an owner-occupied flat rather than a rented flat is 2%, and the additional 
benefit from living in a large house a further 10 percent. Housing supply parameters were chosen 
so that that the quantity of flats would increase by approximately one percent for a one percent 
increase in prices, but that the number of houses and flats would be approximately the same in 
the elastic and inelastic cases.  
The model was solved for inflation rates ranging from 0 to 3 percent, reflecting the legal 
requirement that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand achieve stability in the general level of 
prices. This requirement currently requires the Bank to keep inflation between 1 and 3 percent. 
The effect of higher inflation rates were not investigated as the purpose of the paper was to 
ascertain whether low rates of inflation have an appreciable effect on economic welfare.  
2.8.  Solution technique 




ttt t PPP τ
=−  so that when each agent j born in period t-i, i= 0,…3  is consuming a 




tis tis s c −+ −+ = I that solves their constrained utility 
                                                 
12 The top income tax rate was increased from 33 percent to 39 percent in 2000. However, many landlords can use 
property trusts to lower their marginal tax rate to 33 percent. This is the reason why the main simulations have been 
done using a top tax rate of 33 percent.  
13 In this case the constraints in equation 11 and the aggregation condition (13c) are modified accordingly.  
 16 
 
problem given by equation (11), the aggregation conditions 13a – 13e applied at time t are 
satisfied. In the steady state, the vector { }
3,..0,...3 ,,,
gRFH
ttt t PPP τ
=−  can be calculated from the 
vector 
*
0 {, , , }
gFFH PP τ πρ =  and the parameters { } 2 , r τ .  
The basic structure of the algorithm is as follows.  
Let the vector 
*,
0 {, , , }
k g F F Hk PP τ πρ =  be the k
th estimate of the steady state solution 
* P . Given 
*,k P , calculate the optimal consumption and housing tenure paths for each of the N 
households who are born at t=0 by searching over the different possible tenure paths in the set 
Η.  
a)  Use these results to calculate the demand for consumption goods and housing at time 
t=0 for all households in the economy.  
b)  Use these results to calculate aggregate consumption, the aggregate demand for flats, 
and the aggregate demand for houses at time t=0. Then calculate the excess demand 
functions given by 13a – 13e.  
c)  If the excess demand functions are not sufficiently close to zero, a new estimate of the 
equilibrium prices
* P ,
*, 1 k P
+ , is calculated. This is done using a discrete approximation 
to the Newton-Rhapson method. A set of quasi-derivatives is calculated by 
recalculating the set of excess demand functions at the prices  1 { ,,,}
g FFH P τ πρ +∆ , 
2 {, , , }
gF FH P τ πρ +∆ ,  3 {, , , }
gFF H P τπ ρ +∆  and {, , ,
gFFH P τ πρ +  4} ∆ . These 
quasi derivatives are used to calculate the updated price vector using Broyden’s 
method. The process is continued until the sequence of estimates 
*,k P converges.  
2.9.  Comparison to other models 
The model is related to earlier models by Slemrod (1982), Hayashi, Ito and Slemrod 
(1988), Feldstein (1997), Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1998, 2006), and Coleman (2007). Slemrod 
(1982) solves a similar model of the household to explore how taxes and credit constraints affect 
inter-temporal housing and saving choices.  His model has a similar asymmetric treatment of 
capital taxes on positive and negative asset positions, and imposes a maximum loan-to-value 
constraint. The price of housing is determined exogenously, but agents can choose the size of 
their house. Hayashi, Ito, and Slemrod solve a version of this model that uses log-linear utility of 
the form used in this paper. The basic framework including the housing model is adapted from 
Ortalo-Magné and Rady, although they only use the version with inelastic supply. Several of the 
modifications were first made in Coleman (2007) including the use of log-linear preferences 17 
 
rather than linear preferences, the incorporation of the mortgage-repayment-to-income 
constraint, and a wider range of housing options. This model extends the earlier model by 
Coleman by incorporating taxes and an elastic housing supply.  
3. Results 
The focus of the paper is the way that the inflation rate changes the effect of the tax 
system on the housing market. The main results are established by finding the equilibrium prices 
and GST rate that correspond to a set of parameters as the inflation rate is varied from 0 to 3 
percent. In tables 2 – 5, various outcomes of interest are presented when the tax rates are 
12 (, ) ττ = {(0%, 0%), (20%, 20%), (20%, 33%)}. In tables 2 and 3, the housing supply is either 
inelastic or elastic and all interest earnings are taxed; in tables 4 and 5 the housing supply is either 
inelastic or elastic and the inflation component of interest earning are tax exempt. The tables 
show how rents, flat prices, house prices, the number of flats and houses, the number of people 
renting, and the GST rate vary with the inflation rate for each different tax combination. 
Inelastic housing supply, all interest earnings taxed. 
Table 2 and figures 1 and 2 indicate how inflation and tax affect the housing market 
when the supply of housing is determined exogenously. When the income tax rate is zero, flat 
prices, house prices and rents are little affected by the inflation rate, falling by approximately 1 
percent as the inflation rate increases from 0 to 3 percent.
14 However, the fraction of the 
youngest cohort renting increases as the inflation rate increases from 0 to 3 percent, from 21 
percent to 31 percent. These results follows from the way rents are determined. When the 
number of flats and houses is fixed, the price of a flat is determined by its value to the marginal 
resident, which depends on the additional benefit of living independently rather than in the 
parental home. For the assumed values of ν
R and ν
F, this is approximately equal to 30 percent of 
the income of the marginal occupier; this sum varies only slightly with the inflation rate as 
lifetime utility and thus the amount desired to be spent on housing changes only slightly.
15
                                                 
14 Coleman (2007) discusses the situation at length. 
 As 
rents vary little with inflation, flat prices vary little. The housing tenure choice is affected by the 
inflation rate, however, because more and more low income households find it preferable to rent 
rather than purchase as nominal interest rates increase.  
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When the tax rates are positive, there are three competing tendencies. When the inflation 
rate is zero, the fraction of the young cohort renting is decreasing in the tax rate. This is because 
imputed rent is tax exempt, providing households with an incentive to own their own home 
rather than to rent and accumulate financial assets. The effect is sufficiently large that the 
fraction renting falls to zero when 
12 (, ) ττ =(20%, 33%). As the inflation rate increases, however, 
there are two other effects. First, landlords are attracted to the housing market to take advantage 
of tax free capital gains.  Because they are on a higher marginal tax rate than low income tenants, 
they value the tax concession more highly than tenants and thus the amount they are prepared to 
pay for rental property is a steeply increasing function of the inflation rate (Litzenberg and Sosin 
(1979)). When both the high and low marginal tax rates are 20 percent, the equilibrium flat price 
increases by 8 percent when the inflation rate increases from 0 to 3 percent; when the top 
marginal tax rate is 33 percent, there is a 17 percent increase. Secondly, nominal interest rates 
increase as the inflation rate increases and low income, credit constrained households find it 
increasingly difficult to make mortgage payments. The result is a squeeze that sees landlords 
replace young households as the owners of flats. For 
12 (, ) ττ =(20%, 20%), the fraction of the 
young cohort renting increases from 6 to 32 percent as the inflation rate increases from 0 to 3 
percent; for 
12 (, ) ττ =(20%, 33%), the increase is larger, from 0 to 42 percent.  
Figure 3 shows the fraction of the young cohort that rents as a function of tax rates and 
inflation rates. When the inflation rate is less than 1 percent, the fraction of the young cohort 
that rents declines as tax rates increase, due to the rising value of the imputed rent tax 
concession. When the inflation rate is 2 or 3 percent, the effect of higher mortgage rates and the 
increasing attractiveness of property to high marginal rate investors means that the fraction that 
rents is an increasing function of the top marginal tax rate. Thus even though landlords and 
owner-occupiers derive benefits from residential housing tax concessions, the effect of taxes on 
ownership patterns depends crucially on the inflation rate.  
Elastic housing supply, all interest earnings taxed. 
Table 3 and figures 4 – 6 indicate how inflation and tax affect the housing market when 
the supply of housing is elastic. Again, flat prices, house prices, rents, and the total number of 
houses are little affected by the inflation rate when the income tax rate is zero. Moreover, as 
before, the fraction of the youngest cohort renting increases as the inflation rate increases from 0 
to 3 percent, from 23 to 28 percent.  There is a difference from the inelastic case, however: as 
the inflation rate increases, the composition of the housing stock changes, with more flats and 
fewer large houses. This is because fewer young households can afford the nominal mortgage 19 
 
payment on large houses when the inflation rate increases, so they purchase a small house as a 
temporary measure.  
 When tax rates are positive, the fraction of the young cohort that rents increases with 
the inflation rate by a similar amount as when the housing supply is inelastic: in the case that 
12 (, ) ττ =(20%, 33%), the fraction renting increases from 0 to 35 percent as inflation increases 
from 0 to 3 percent. The mechanism is quite different, however. In the inelastic case, flat prices 
increased as inflation increased because landlords bid up prices to take advantage of the tax 
concession. In the elastic case, prices of houses do not increase by very much, but landlords bid 
rents down. The combination of slightly higher flat prices and significantly lower rents results in 
a big increase in the number of low income households choosing to rent, but it also leads to a 
larger stock of flats and a reduction in the number of households living at home with their 
parents.  
Exempting the inflation component of interest earnings from tax.  
It has long been argued that many of the economic distortions caused by the interaction 
of the inflation and income tax could be avoided by changing the tax code so that only real 
interest income was taxed (Aaron 1976; Fischer and Summers 1989; Feldstein 1996). In practice, 
this would mean two adjustments: the inflation component of interest earnings would be exempt 
from income tax; and borrowers would only be allowed to deduct the real interest component of 
interest payments from taxable income.
16
The results are dramatically different. When the supply of housing is inelastic, changes in 
the inflation rate only have small effects on house prices and home ownership rates. Indeed the 
effects are very similar to the case when taxes are zero: as the inflation rate increases from 0 to 3 
percent, the fraction of the youngest cohort renting increases because nominal mortgage rates 
rise, but by 8 percent rather than by 42 percent. The difference with the “normal” tax case is that 
wealthy households have little incentive to become landlords as they no longer pay tax on the 
Inflation component of interest earnings if they accumulate financial assets.
 The effects of these two changes in the tax code on the 
housing market are shown in tables 4 and 5, and in figures 1 – 2 and 4 – 6. The GST rate is 
adjusted so that total nominal taxes are the same.  
17
                                                 
16 Economists have also recommended changing depreciation allowances and exempting the inflation component of 
capital gains from tax.  
  Consequently, 
landlords do not bid up the price of flats as the inflation rate increases. A similar result holds 
17 The tax on the inflation component of interest earnings is often called the widows’ tax because most lenders in an 
economy are over 65. 20 
 
when the supply of housing is elastic. In this case, wealthy households do not compete to 
become landlords, rents are not bid down as the inflation rate increases, fewer houses are built, 
and home-ownership rates amongst the young scarcely change.  
It is worth noting that exempting the inflation component of interest earnings from tax 
has little effect on tax revenue. Even when the inflation rate is 3 percent, the GST rate needs to 
be increased by less than 0.2% to raise the same amount of revenue. This is because little 
revenue is raised by taxing the inflation component of interest even when inflation is moderate, 
for high income households rearrange their finances to avoid it, in this case by becoming 
landlords. Even though this generates tax revenue on rental income, it is offset by a decrease in 
tax paid on interest. This offset occurs partly because the mortgage payments made by landlords 
are tax deductible.  
Utility calculations 
The maximum lifetime utility levels of each agent can be calculated as a function of 
equilibrium prices. These can be used to calculate how welfare changes across the income 
distribution as the inflation rate changes. Figures 7 and 8 show how utility levels change when 
the inflation rate increases from 0 to 3 percent. In each case the change in life-time utility is 
shown as a function of income in the first period.
18
Figure 7 shows how utility changes when the supply of houses is inelastic and the tax 
rates are 
  
12 ( , ) (20%,33%) ττ = . When nominal interest earnings are taxed, the increase in the 
inflation rate reduces welfare across the board, by between 2 and 4 percent. The effect is largest 
on middle income households. These households experience a reduction in welfare because of 
changes to their housing consumption patterns, as they rent rather than purchase or delay their 
purchase of large houses in response to higher nominal interest rates. High income households, 
whose housing arrangements are typically unaffected by the inflation rate, experience a welfare 
reduction because they change the timing of their consumption and face higher real capital 
income taxes.  
The figure also shows how welfare changes when the inflation component of interest 
earnings is exempt from tax. In this case there are few welfare changes. Middle income agents 
increase utility a little; low income agents experience a small welfare reduction, as they rent rather 
than own their homes in response to higher nominal interest rates; but for both groups the 
welfare changes are smaller than 1 percent, and typically less than 0.5 percent. The middle 
                                                 
18 As the utility function is log linear, the change in utility has an approximate interpretation as the percentage 
change in consumption that would make an agent indifferent between the two inflation rates.  21 
 
income group experiences an improvement in welfare because the GST rate falls when inflation 
rises. This occurs because the Government derives revenue from the tax on rent.  
Figure 8 shows the change in utility that occurs when the housing supply is elastic. In the 
case that nominal interest earnings are taxed, the welfare changes are very different than when 
the housing supply is inelastic. In particular, inflation improves the welfare of low income 
households, by up to 4 percent. There are two reasons for this improvement. First, rents fall, and 
this fall more than offsets the decline in welfare that comes from being a tenant rather than an 
owner-occupier. Secondly, more flats are built, and the lowest income households gain from the 
opportunity to live independently rather than in the parental home. (The peak welfare 
improvement accrues to the highest income person that lived at home when the inflation rate 
was zero.) These gains are offset by welfare losses of middle income and high income 
households, the latter of approximately 2 percent, as these households pay higher taxes on their 
interest income. For the economy as a whole, average welfare is reduced, although this result 
need not occur.
19
This result warrants further comment. Low income agents who rent when they are young 
have low consumption as they have low current income and cannot borrow against their higher 
future incomes because of bank imposed credit constraints. Consequently, anything that reduces 
their rent will lead to an increase in their consumption, and an improvement in their welfare. 
Landlords are prepared to accept lower rents when the inflation rate increases since it reduces 
the after tax real interest rate, and capital gains are taxed less than interest payments. In essence, 
the existence of one economic distortion (the asymmetric taxes on the inflation component of 
interest earnings and capital gains) helps to reduce the effect of a second economic distortion 
(credit constraints preventing young people from borrowing against future income) when there is 
inflation. If young people were able to borrow against future income for consumption purposes, 
inflation would still reduce rents but it would have minimal effects on welfare as it would 
primarily affect the amount young people borrowed, not the amount they consumed.  
 
When the inflation component of interest is exempt from the tax, the welfare changes 
are almost the same irrespective of whether the housing supply is elastic or inelastic. This is 
because neither rent nor the total quantity of housing change by much in the elastic case, and 
thus outcomes are similar to the situation when the housing supply is elastic. Note that this 
means that if the inflation component of interest earnings were tax exempt and the housing 
supply was sufficiently elastic, welfare would decline for some low income households. This 
                                                 
19 In particular, the equally weighted average change in utility is negative.  22 
 
decline would take place as high income households would no longer compete with each other 
to provide low rent accommodation to low income households in order to avoid the tax on the 
inflation component of interest earnings.   
4. Parameter variations 
The results in section 3 show how various facets of the economy are affected by the 
inflation rate or tax rates. These results were calculated for a single set of the remaining 
parameters. In this section, the effect of changing some of these parameters is outlined. In 
general, with two exceptions, the results are qualitatively robust to changes in other parameters 
such as the tightness of credit constraints, the mix of houses and flats, or the utility households 
gain from different tenure arrangements. The exceptions, discussed below, concern the discount 
rate and the real interest rate. 
Tables  6 and 7 show the effects of different parameter variations in the inelastic supply 
and elastic supply cases. Each row of table 6 shows the outcome when a single parameter is 
changed. The table shows the rent, flat price, house price and the fraction of the young cohort 
that rents when the inflation rate is 2 percent, and also the fraction of the young cohort that 
rents when the inflation rate is 0. The difference between the last two numbers is used to 
calculate the “slope” column: how the number of young households that rent changes as the 
inflation rate increases by 1 percentage point. This statistic is used as a summary statistic for 
measuring how inflation affects homeownership rates. In table 7 this information is presented as 
well as the equilibrium number of flats and houses. 
Table 6 indicates that neither the tightness of credit constraints, the mix of housing 
types, or the relative utility of different tenure options has much effect on the extent to which 
inflation affects the home-ownership rate of young households. In all cases, a one percent 
increase in the inflation rate led to a 9 – 14 percent increase in the number of young households 
renting. However, the table indicates that the effect of inflation on home-ownership rates is very 
sensitive to both the real interest rate and the discount rate. When real interest rates were 6 
percent or larger, inflation had very little effect on home-ownership rates; in fact the model 
predicts that property prices would fall sufficiently far that almost all households would purchase 
flats or houses rather than rent. In contrast, when real interest rates fall to 4 percent, inflation 
had a very large effect on home-ownership rates: each percentage point increase in the inflation 
rate is associated with a 24% increase in the fraction of young households that rent. At even 
lower real interest rates, almost all young households rent rather than purchase, as the property 
prices become very high.  23 
 
Homeownership rates are sensitive to real interest rates when the supply of housing is 
inelastic for two reasons. First, house prices are sensitive to real interest rates, falling as real 
interest rates increase and rising as real interest rates decrease. By itself, this would not lead to 
changes in homeownership rates, as the real financing cost  (real interest rate multiplied by the 
flat price) changes little as interest rates change. However, the ratio of the annual loan repayment 
amount to the annual interest payment amount increases as real interest rates fall, as the fraction 
of the payment that is loan repayment rises (equation 8). This means that credit constrained 
households that rent have the option of consuming much more than households that purchase 
and are obliged to make large loan repayments. The model suggests that when interest rates are 
low this option is sufficiently attractive that a large number of young households are prepared to 
lower their lifetime consumption in order to have more of this consumption at a young age.
20
A very similar pattern of results holds in the elastic supply case. The effect of inflation on 
homeownership rates is not particularly sensitive to the tightness of credit constraints, building 
costs, or the utility value of different tenure options, but is sensitive to the discount rate and real 
interest rates. However, the mechanism is quite different. In this case, there is little effect on 
property prices as parameters change, but rents and the equilibrium number of flats and houses 
are affected. When real interest rates decline, rents fall, more flats are built, and the home-
ownership rates of young households decline sharply.  
  
In the main parameterisation, with real interest rates equal to 5 percent and the discount 
rate β equal to 0.97, a one percent increase in the inflation rate reduces homeownership rates 
among young households by 11 percentage points in either the elastic or inelastic cases. When 
households are more patient, represented by an increase in the discount rate to 0.98, the 
reduction in the home-ownership rate is only 5 percent as fewer households choose to rent in 
order to increase current consumption at the expense of future consumption. This suggests that 
overall effect of inflation on the housing market will depend not only on the distribution of 
income but also on the distribution of discount rates. In an attempt to ascertain the effect of 
having households that differ by discount rate and income, the model was reconfigured to have 
half the households with a discount rate of 0.98 and half with 0.97.
21
                                                 
20 The reduction in lifetime consumption occurs because households save less early in life. In addition, they receive 
less utility from living in a rented house than an owned house.   
 In this simulation, the effect 
of inflation on home-ownership rates was midway between 5 and 11 percent. From this 
evidence, it would appear that inflation is likely to have smaller effects on home-ownership rates 
in societies where households are more patient.  
21 The income distribution spanned the same range as before.  24 
 
The final variation concerns a change in the allowable housing options. This variation is 
analysed at length in Coleman (2009), where agents are allowed to rent half a house, and are 
allowed to rent throughout their lives. The results are qualitatively similar, but the number of 
agents renting is significantly higher, particularly when the ratio of property prices to income is 
high. This is because many young lower income agents prefer to rent half a flat rather than live 
by themselves even when the inflation rate is zero, as this enables them to have much higher 
consumption when young, and the marginal utility of consumption is high. In turn, inflation has 
a much smaller effect on homeownership rates as homeownership is relatively unattractive to 
low income agents. Consequently, inflation is likely to have a much smaller effect on home 
ownership rates where it is socially acceptable to share accommodation with a group of unrelated 
people (as it is in Australasia) and where house prices are relatively high. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper extends a long literature that has examined how the tax system affects the 
economy when the inflation rate is non-zero. Like many of these papers, its focus is the way that 
the tax system distorts the housing market and inter-temporal consumption choices. This aspect 
of the economy is the focus because when inflation is at low or moderate levels it has its greatest 
proportional effects on nominal interest rates. Consequently, the effects of inflation are likely to 
be largest in sectors of the economy where changes in nominal interest rates have the biggest 
effect.   
In the model inflation has real effects because of two different nominal rigidities. The 
first is the Government imposed requirement that households pay income tax on the inflation 
component of interest earnings – the widows’ tax. The second is financial sector imposed 
restrictions on the amount households can borrow, restrictions that are increasingly onerous as 
the inflation rate increases because they are expressed in nominal not real terms. These 
restrictions mean inflation has welfare effects even when it is constant and perfectly anticipated.  
The paper’s key contribution to the existing literature is to endogenise property prices in 
a model that simultaneously incorporates owner-occupied and rental sectors. This means the 
effects of changes in tax rates and the inflation rate that take into account the interaction of 
households that differ by age and income can be calculated. These interactions are important, 
because tax rules and credit constraints affect households in quite different ways. Indeed, the 
model suggests that endogenous changes in house prices or rents are a key mechanism by which 
the effects of inflation on the economy are transmitted.  25 
 
Four results of the model should be emphasised. First, when all nominal interest earnings 
are taxed, small increases in the inflation rate can cause large reductions in the home-ownership 
rates of young cohorts. This can occur because young households find the higher nominal 
mortgage payments associated with higher inflation onerous as they cannot borrow additional 
amounts to maintain desired consumption patterns. When the model is parameterised to mimic 
New Zealand tax rates, when households choose between owning and renting but don’t consider 
renting a portion of a house, and when real interest rates are 5 percent, a one percent increase in 
the inflation rate is associated with an 8 - 10 percent decrease in the home-ownership rates of 
young households, irrespective of whether the supply of housing is elastic or inelastic.  
Secondly, the welfare effects of inflation depend on the elasticity of the housing supply. 
When the supply of housing is inelastic, inflation causes a significant reduction in the welfare of 
all households. In this case, inflation leads to higher house prices as landlords bid up prices to 
avoid the tax on the inflation component of interest income and take advantage of the 
concessionary tax status of residential housing. Inflation reduces the welfare of low income 
households because they rent rather than purchase a home in order to maintain consumption 
levels early in life; inflation reduces the welfare of middle and high income because they delay 
purchasing large houses and earn lower real after tax returns from their investments. In contrast, 
when the supply of housing is elastic, competition between landlords leads to lower rents and the 
construction of additional houses. In this case inflation raises the welfare of the lowest income 
groups, for even though a large fraction choose to rent rather than purchase a home, the lower 
rent more than offsets the welfare losses stemming from being a tenant rather than an owner-
occupier. Middle and high income households still lose from inflation, however, partly because 
they delay purchasing large houses. The overall welfare consequences of inflation will depend on 
the relative numbers of low income and high income households. In the main parameterisations 
studied in this paper, the losses to middle and high income agents are larger than the gains to low 
income households, but this need not be the case.  
Thirdly, the effects of inflation on home-ownership rates depend on real interest rates, 
and are much greater when real interest rates are low rather than when they are high. This is 
because the ratio of mortgage repayments (including capital repayments) to rents reduces as real 
interest rates increase, reducing the disincentive for credit constrained households to purchase a 
house. In the model simulations, moderate inflation had little effect on home-ownership rates 
when real interest rates were 6 percent or more. This feature of the model suggests that the 
effect of low inflation on the housing market may have been minimal in New Zealand prior to 
2000, for real interest rates between 1985 and 2000 typically exceeded six percent.  26 
 
Fourthly, the effects of inflation on the housing market, and on home ownership 
patterns, would largely be avoided if the inflation component of nominal interest earnings were 
exempt from income. The main changes in home ownership patterns stem from the incentives 
that induce high income households to become landlords when the inflation rate increases, to 
take advantage of tax free capital gains from property appreciation. If the inflation component of 
interest earnings were exempt from income tax, this incentive would disappear and inflation 
would have only modest effects on the housing market due to the effect on credit constraints.  
These findings are consistent with Feldstein’s (1997) argument that even low inflation 
can cause significant welfare losses because of its effect on housing markets and inter-temporal 
consumption choices. The paper adds sophistication to his analysis, however, by simultaneously 
considering the effects of inflation on housing markets and inter-temporal consumption 
patterns, by allowing for the different effects of income tax on households with positive and 
negative debt positions, by allowing for a rental market as well as home-ownership, and by 
endogenising house prices. With one exception, none of these factors overturn his essential 
insights into the harmful consequences of low inflation. The exception concerns the way 
inflation can improve the welfare of young low income agents who rent, by lowering their rents 
and raising their consumption while young. 
This paper also adds to a long line of papers that suggests welfare could be improved if 
the inflation component of interest income were not taxed. This paper suggests that the extent 
of the welfare gains depends on the elasticity of housing supply, but the gains could be 
substantial – not surprising, perhaps, since the inflation component of interest earnings is not 
income. The paper further suggests that if the inflation component of interest were exempt from 
tax (and only real interest payments were tax deductible) home ownership rates would increase. 
Claims by Feldstein (1996) notwithstanding, it would not be difficult to change tax laws so that 
approved financial instruments were taxed only on the real component of interest earnings; nor 
would it be difficult to only allow the deduction of real rather than nominal interest payments 
from taxable income.   27 
 
Table 1. Parameterisation of the model. 
Parameter  Description  Value   Source/Rationale 
T  Length of period   10 years  To approximate work 
history from age 25 – 75  
0
t Y   Average  income 
of 25-35 cohort 
50000  NZ Census 2001: average 
male and female 
earnings, 25-35 year olds, 
are $32800 and $23300 
respectively 





i g   Lifecycle income  
pattern 
{1, 1.5, 1.5, 
0.75+20000} 
NZ Census, 1966-  2001. 
Based on real lifecycle 
earnings of cohort 
turning 20 in 1946, 1961.  
Β  Discount factor  0.97 annualised  Arbitrary 
{ } ,,
RFH vvv   Utility from 
housing   { } 0.33,0.35,0.45
 
Arbitrary 
i κ   Inheritance 
timing 
{0,0,1,0}  Arbitrary 
H nN   Fraction of 
houses 
0.57   Arbitrary 
F nN   Fraction of flats  0.42   Arbitrary  
Η  Mortgage term  25 years  Standard mortgage term 
in 1990s 
δ  Maximum debt 
service-income 
ratio 
30%  Reflects NZ banking 
conditions 
Θ  Maximum loan 
to value ratio 
90%  Reflects NZ banking 
conditions 
* g τ   GST rate  0.10  Tax take equals 10% of 
labour income; arbitrary, 
but close to NZ rate. 
*













1,  9300 
Arbitrary, generates 
approximately 1% price 
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Table 2: Output of Model with inelastic supply. 
Normal taxes 
Tax rates  Inflation rate 
  0  1  2  3 
  Flat prices 
(0,0)  $166,286  $166,397  $165,788  $165,034 
(20,20)  $154,558  $158,922  $162,615  $166,516 
(20,33)  $147,207  $154,534  $163,247  $171,990 
 
  House prices 
(0,0)  $269,364  $268,470  $267,434  $266,331 
(20,20)  $256,960  $260,735  $262,004  $264,058 
(20,33)  $249,712  $255,027  $260,838  $266,629 
 
  Rents 
(0,0)  $6,425  $6,425  $6,400  $6,375 
(20,20)  $6,469  $6,475  $6,475  $6,475 
(20,33)  $6,521  $6,467  $6,482  $6,468 
 
  Number people renting 
(0,0)  86  98  113  126 
(20,20)  24  64  83  135 
(20,33)  0  40  87  180 
 
  Fraction of young cohort renting 
(0,0)  21.5%  24.5%  28.3%  31.5% 
(20,20)  5.8%  16.0%  20.8%  32.3% 
(20,33)  0.0%  10.0%  21.8%  42.3% 
 
  Number of flats and houses 
(0,0)  580 + 900  580 + 900  580 + 900  580 + 900 
(20,20)  580 + 900  580 + 900  580 + 900  580 + 900 
(20,33)  580 + 900  580 + 900  580 + 900  580 + 900 
 
  GST rate 
(0,0)  9.5%  9.5%  9.4%  9.4% 
(20,20)  8.2%  8.1%  7.9%  7.9% 
(20,33)  8.3%  8.1%  8.0%  8.0% 
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Table 3: Output of Model with elastic supply. 
Normal taxes 
Tax rates  Inflation rate 
  0  1  2  3 
  Flat prices 
(0,0)  $147,266  $147,279  $147,242  $147,263 
(20,20)  $146,388  $146,716  $147,043  $147,275 
(20,33)  $145,634  $146,393  $147,059  $147,535 
 
  House Prices 
(0,0)  $249,551  $249,482  $249,343  $249,297 
(20,20)  $248,461  $248,747  $248,922  $248,979 
(20,33)  $247,695  $248,238  $248,763  $249,028 
 
  Rents 
(0,0)  $5,681  $5,683  $5,681  $5,682 
(20,20)  $6,123  $5,983  $5,857  $5,735 
(20,33)  $6,442  $6,130  $5,842  $5,551 
 
  Number of people renting 
(0,0)  92  98  102  114 
(20,20)  25  61  90  111 
(20,33)  0  38  90  145 
 
  Fraction of young cohort renting 
(0,0)  23.0%  24.5%  25.5%  28.5% 
(20,20)  6.3%  15.3%  22.5%  27.8% 
(20,33)  0.0%  9.5%  22.5%  35.3% 
 
  Number of flats and houses 
(0,0)  669 + 929  678 + 920  687 + 910  694 + 903 
(20,20)  682 + 907  689 + 903  708 + 888  727 + 870 
(20,33)  675 + 906  704 + 884  725 + 870   751 + 849 
 
  GST rate 
(0,0)  9.4%  9.4%  9.4%  9.4% 
(20,20)  8.2%  8.0%  7.9%  7.8% 
(20,33)  8.3%  8.1%  8.0%  8.0% 
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Table 4: Output of Model with inelastic supply.  
The inflation component of interest is tax exempt.  
Tax rates  Inflation rate 
  0  1  2  3 
  Flat prices 
(0,0)  $166,286  $166,397  $165,788  $165,034 
(20,20)  $154,419  $154,638  $154,613  $154,811 
(20,33)  $146,588  $146,507  $146,270  $146,917 
 
  House Prices 
(0,0)  $269,364  $268,470  $267,434  $266,331 
(20,20)  $256,835  $256,847  $256,684  $256,404 
(20,33)  $248,971  $247,772  $247,330  $248,066 
 
  Rents 
(0,0)  $6,425  $6,425  $6,400  $6,375 
(20,20)  $6,467  $6,475  $6,475  $6,475 
(20,33)  $6,485  $6,489  $6,476  $6,502 
 
  Number of people renting 
(0,0)  86  98  113  126 
(20,20)  23  40  56  69 
(20,33)  0  8  19  30 
 
  Fraction of young cohort renting 
(0,0)  21.5%  24.5%  28.3%  31.5% 
(20,20)  5.5%  10.0%  14.0%  17.3% 
(20,33)  0.0%  2.0%  4.8%  7.5% 
 
  Number of flats and houses 
(0,0)  580 + 900   580 + 900   580 + 900   580 + 900  
(20,20)  580 + 900   580 + 900   580 + 900   580 + 900  
(20,33)  580 + 900   580 + 900   580 + 900   580 + 900  
 
  GST rate 
(0,0)  9.5%  9.5%  9.4%  9.4% 
(20,20)  8.2%  8.1%  8.1%  8.1% 
(20,33)  8.3%  8.2%  8.1%  8.0% 
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Table 5: Output of Model with elastic supply. 
The inflation component of interest is tax exempt.  
Tax rates  Inflation rate 
  0  1  2  3 
  Flat prices 
(0,0)  $147,266  $147,279  $147,242  $147,263 
(20,20)  $146,388  $146,377  $146,404  $146,295 
(20,33)  $145,585  $145,637  $145,571  $145,645 
 
  House Prices 
(0,0)  $249,551  $249,482  $249,343  $249,297 
(20,20)  $248,461  $248,430  $248,448  $248,327 
(20,33)  $247,639  $247,553  $247,461  $247,548 
 
  Rents 
(0,0)  $5,681  $5,683  $5,681  $5,682 
(20,20)  $6,123  $6,123  $6,124  $6,121 
(20,33)  $6,438  $6,439  $6,436  $6,443 
 
  Number of people renting 
(0,0)  92  98  102  114 
(20,20)  25  41  55  70 
(20,33)  0  9  19  29 
 
  Fraction of young cohort renting 
(0,0)  23.0%  24.5%  25.5%  28.5% 
(20,20)  6.3%  10.3%  13.8%  17.5% 
(20,33)  0.0%  2.3%  4.8%  7.3% 
 
  Number of flats and houses 
(0,0)  669 + 929  678 + 920  687 + 910  694 + 903 
(20,20)  682 + 907  684 + 905  685 + 904  685 + 903 
(20,33)  675 + 905  690 + 892  692 + 889  691 + 890  
 
  GST rate 
(0,0)  9.4%  9.4%  9.4%  9.4% 
(20,20)  8.2%  8.1%  8.1%  8.1% 
(20,33)  8.3%  8.2%  8.1%  8.1% 
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Table 6: Parameter variations with inelastic supply.  
Parameter 
change 















6480  163200  260800  0%  22%  11 
   
Changing credit constraints (loan to value ratio) 
 
θ = 0.8  6470  163100  259300  2  29  14 
θ = 0.9  6480  163200  260800  0%  22%  11 
θ = 1.0  6500  163500  262700  0  18  9 
   
Changing number of flats and houses 
 
Nh=600,Nf=980  6450  162700  298300  0%  29%  15 
Nh=900,Nf=680  6480  163200  260800  0%  22%  11 
Nh=900,Nf=660  7357  185600  281600  0%  26%  13 
   
Changing the valuation of houses 
 
value= 32 35 45  6300  158800  258000  0%  17%  9 
value= 33 35 45  6480  163200  260800  0%  22%  11 
value= 33 35 46  6500  163500  270600  0%  20%  10 
   
Changing real interest rates, discount β = 0.97 
 
β = 0.97 r = 4  6440  207600  298400  15%  63%  24 
β = 0.97 r = 4.5  6490  183400  278400  7%  51%  22 
β = 0.97 r = 5  6480  163200  260800  0%  22%  11 
β = 0.97 r = 5.5  6510  148500  247200  0%  9%  5 
β = 0.97 r = 6  6850  133300  234300  0%  0%  0 
   
Changing real interest rates, discount β = 0.98 
 
β = 0.98 r = 4  6870  220900  324100  6%  50%  22 
β = 0.98 r = 4.5  6410  180900  284400  1%  21%  10 
β = 0.98 r = 5  6390  161800  267300  0%  10%  5 
β = 0.98 r = 5.5  6320  145600  252300  0%  2%  1 
β = 0.98 r = 6  6990  135600  242300  0%  0%  0 
 Prices worked out when the inflation rate π= 2%. 
“Slope” is the change in the fraction of young cohort renting when there is a 1 percentage 
point increase in the inflation rate. 33 
 
Table 7: Parameter variations with elastic supply.  
Parameter 
change 












Slope  Nh  Nf  Total 
Base 
Parameters 
5840  147100  248800  0%  23%  11  870  725  1595 
   
Changing credit constraints (loan to value ratio) 
   
θ = 0.8  5830  147000  248500  3%  25%  11  853  741  1594 
θ = 0.9  5840  147100  248800  0%  23%  11  870  725  1595 
θ = 1.0  5840  147000  248800  0%  19%  10  880  715  1595 
   
Changing additional cost of constructing a large house 
   
a0h = 93000  5840  147100  248800  0%  23%  11  870  725  1595 
a0h = 143000  6440  145600  293800  0  5%  3  528  1053  1581 
   
Changing the valuation of houses 
   
vv= 32 35 45  5820  146600  248400  0%  16%  8  877  715  1592 
vv= 33 35 45  5840  147100  248800  0%  23%  11  870  725  1595 
vv= 33 35 46  5840  147100  249700  0%  20%  10  964  632  1596 
   
Changing real interest rates, discount rate β = 0.97 
   
β= 0.97 r= 4  4580  147500  249200  15%  59%  22  876  724  1600 
β= 0.97 r= 4.5  5230  147500  249200  7%  39%  16  866  734  1600 
β= 0.97 r= 5  5840  147100  248800  0%  23%  11  870  725  1595 
β= 0.97 r= 5.5  6380  145700  247400  0%  9%  4  863  719  1582 
β= 0.97 r= 6  6850  144500  246200  0%  2%  1  866  705  1571 
   
Changing real interest rates, discount rate β = 0.98 
   
β= 0.98 r= 4  4580  147500  250000  7%  31%  11  945  655  1600 
β= 0.98 r= 4.5  5220  147500  250000  2%  21%  10  951  649  1600 
β= 0.98 r= 5  5830  146900  249400  0%  10%  5  948  646  1594 
β= 0.98 r= 5.5  6330  145500  247900  0%  2%  1  942  638  1580 
β= 0.98 r= 6  6890  144600  247000  0%  0%  0  942  629  1571 
Prices worked out when the inflation rate π= 2%. 
“Slope” is the change in the fraction of young cohort renting when there is a 1 percentage 
point increase in the inflation rate. 
Nh, Nf are the equilibrium number of houses and flats. 34 
 
Figure 1: Price of small houses as inflation increases. 
Inelastic supply, r= 5%. 
 
 
Figure 2: Fraction of young cohort renting as inflation increases. 
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Figure 3: Fraction of young cohort renting as the tax rate and inflation rate vary.
 
 
Figure 4: Price of small houses as inflation increases. 
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Figure 5:  Rent as inflation increases. 
 Elastic supply, r = 5%. 
 
 
Figure 6: Fraction of young cohort renting as inflation increases 
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Figure 7: Welfare change when inflation increases from 0% to 3% 
Inelastic supply, tax = (20%, 33% ) r= 5% 
 
Figure 8: Welfare change when inflation increases from 0% to 3% 
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